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 NASA STI Program ... in Profile 
 
 
Since its founding, NASA has been dedicated  
to the advancement of aeronautics and space 
science. The NASA scientific and technical 
information (STI) program plays a key part in 
helping NASA maintain this important role. 
 
The NASA STI program operates under the 
auspices of the Agency Chief Information Officer. 
It collects, organizes, provides for archiving, and 
disseminates NASA’s STI. The NASA STI 
program provides access to the NTRS Registered 
and its public interface, the NASA Technical 
Reports Server, thus providing one of the largest 
collections of aeronautical and space science STI 
in the world. Results are published in both 
non-NASA channels and by NASA in the NASA 
STI Report Series, which includes the following 
report types: 
 
TECHNICAL PUBLICATION. Reports of 
completed research or a major significant 
phase of research that present the results of 
NASA Programs and include extensive data 
or theoretical analysis. Includes compila- 
tions of significant scientific and technical 
data and information deemed to be of 
continuing reference value. NASA 
counter-part of peer-reviewed formal 
professional papers but has less stringent 
limitations on manuscript length and extent of 
graphic presentations. 
 
TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM.  
Scientific and technical findings that are 
preliminary or of specialized interest,  
e.g., quick release reports, working  
papers, and bibliographies that contain 
minimal annotation. Does not contain 
extensive analysis. 
 
CONTRACTOR REPORT. Scientific and 
technical findings by NASA-sponsored 
contractors and grantees. 
CONFERENCE PUBLICATION.  
Collected papers from scientific and 
technical conferences, symposia, seminars, 
or other meetings sponsored or  
co-sponsored by NASA. 
 
SPECIAL PUBLICATION. Scientific, 
technical, or historical information from 
NASA programs, projects, and missions, 
often concerned with subjects having 
substantial public interest. 
 
TECHNICAL TRANSLATION.  
English-language translations of foreign 
scientific and technical material pertinent to  
NASA’s mission. 
 
Specialized services also include organizing  
and publishing research results, distributing 
specialized research announcements and 
feeds, providing information desk and personal 
search support, and enabling data exchange 
services. 
 
For more information about the NASA STI 
program, see the following: 
 
Access the NASA STI program home page 
at ​http://www.sti.nasa.gov 
 
E-mail your question to ​help@sti.nasa.gov 
 
Phone the NASA STI Information Desk at  
757-864-9658 
 
Write to: 
NASA STI Information Desk 
Mail Stop 148 
NASA Langley Research Center 
Hampton, VA 23681-2199 
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1. Introduction 
UTM has the stated goal of providing safe, efficient, and fair access to the low-altitude               
airspace for small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS). The management of these           
sUAS operations is envisioned to take a different form than the management of             
traditional aviation in the National Airspace System (NAS). In UTM, management of            
the airspace is a partnership between the Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) and             
the users of the airspace. Some of the key services that might have been provided by                
the ANSP for traditional aviation are provided instead by a federated set of UAS              
Service Suppliers (USS). A new, UTM-specific component that is implemented on the            
ANSP side for this system is called the Flight Information Management System (FIMS).             
This federated, collaborative approach to airspace management supports several key          
properties of the UTM System including scalability, enabling more seamless evolution,           
partitioning sUAS management from traditional aviation, and others. For a          
comprehensive description of the UTM System, both versions of the Concept of            
Operations ([UTM_ConOps_NASA] and [UTM_ConOps_FAA]) provide the primary       
starting points.  
The NASA ConOps ([NASAConOps]) document is an initial description of the concept            
and NASA's approach to building and testing that concept. The FAA UTM ConOps             
([FAAConOps]) document is an evolution and update of NASA’s concept with a focus             
on use cases. For a deeper dive on the UTM Concept, details are deferred to those two                 
documents. 
To provide an overview of what a USS is, the following is an excerpt from               
[FAAConOps]: 
A USS is an entity that provides services to support the safe and efficient use of 
airspace by providing services to the Operator in meeting UTM operational 
requirements. A USS: 
1. acts as a communications bridge between federated UTM actors to 
support Operators’ abilities to meet the regulatory and operational 
requirements for UAS operations, and 
2. provides the Operator with demand forecasts for a volume of airspace so 
that the Operator can ascertain the ability to efficiently conduct their 
mission, and 
3. archives operations data in historical databases for analytics, regulatory, 
and Operator accountability purposes. 
In general, these key functions allow for a network of USSs to provide cooperative 
management of low altitude operations without direct FAA involvement. USS 
services support operations planning, aircraft de-confliction, conformance 
monitoring, and emergency information dissemination. USSs may also work, if 
applicable, with local municipalities and communities to gather, incorporate, and 
maintain airspace restrictions and local airspace rules into airspace constraint 
data (e.g., preemptive airspace). USSs may also provide other value-added 
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services to support UTM participants as market forces create opportunity to 
meet business needs. See Appendix D for a more detailed description of a USS. 
This document provides the minimum set of requirements for a USS. In order to be               
recognized as a USS within UTM, successful demonstration of satisfying the           
requirements described herein will be a prerequisite. 
The collection of USSs working to manage the airspace within the UTM Concept is              
called the “USS Network.” For a more formal definition, this document defers to the              
[UTMGlossary]. 
This document is primarily targeted at implementers of USS systems, though it may be              
informative to other stakeholders within UTM. 
To ensure various desired qualities (security, fairness, availability, efficiency,         
maintainability, etc.), this specification relies on references to existing public          
specifications whenever possible. 
This document is a research artifact from the NASA UTM Project. It is intended to               
facilitate convergence on the concept, allow for implementation of interoperable test           
systems, and lay the groundwork for a future, formal specification. This is not a formal               
standard. 
2. Notational Conventions 
The key words 'MUST,' 'MUST NOT,' 'REQUIRED,' 'SHALL,' 'SHALL NOT,' 'SHOULD,'           
'SHOULD NOT,' 'RECOMMENDED,' 'NOT RECOMMENDED,' 'MAY,' and 'OPTIONAL'        
in this document are to be interpreted as described in [​RFC2119​]. 
The key word definitions form a well-defined superset of the NASA-recommended           
language for requirement description found in [NASASysEng]. 
Requirements (i.e., "MUST" statements) are indicated in ​green, italicized sentences​,          
with each sentence being a single requirement. A summary of the requirements is             
provided at the end of the document. 
Requirements that are currently assumed to be needed, but are not yet defined, are              
marked by a superscript tag in the text. A summary of these tags is provided at the end                  
of the document. 
3. Terminology 
A USS is discussed with an active voice, as if it is an organization or entity, when in                  
reality it is a collection of software, services, and interfaces. When a statement such as               
"A USS may do this" is made, it is understood to mean that "A software implementation                
adhering to the USS Specification may be implemented to do this." This is a stylistic               
choice for the goal of clarity. 
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For lack of other current terminology, all small UAS (sUAS) operations that would             
require a waiver under Part 107 (i.e., commercial operations) or require a waiver under              
Part 101, Subpart E (i.e., hobbyist operations also called "Part 101E") will be called              
"Part 107X operations" until there is a more appropriate term or rule introduced. All              
operations that are not flown under Part 101, Subpart E will be referred to as               
“non-hobbyist operations” in this document.  
This document defers to other UTM definitions in the [UTMGlossary]. No other new             
terminology is introduced in this document. 
4. USS Overview 
The overall description of a USS within UTM is provided in [UTMConOps]. If there are               
discrepancies between that document and this one, deference is to this document            
since it is more current. To ground discussion regarding the various components in the              
UTM System and illustrate the position of USSs within it, ​Figure 1 is provided (in               
updated form) from the [UTMConOps]: 
 
Figure 1. UTM Architecture. 
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 The set of other USSs with which a USS are required to communicate are said to be                 
that USS’s Local USS Network or LUN . The concept of a LUN is important in the                1
definition of requirements within this document. 
In order to avoid unintended discrepancies, no further summary or details are provided             
on the USS role or concept within UTM. Rather, the details and requirements for              
implementing a USS are provided herein. 
5. Authority to Operate 
This document is designed to be a reference for stakeholders in the future UTM              
System as it is targeted for deployment in the United States. However, there will be               
wider applicability of the information contained herein. As such, details regarding risk            
management and software assurance are not provided, as these requirements will           
need to be appropriately tailored. From the NASA UTM Project’s perspective,           
however, there are some high-level principles that should be applied to USSs seeking             
to collaboratively manage traffic in the U.S. National Airspace System. Requirements           
in this regard lead to a USS’s authority to operate as a USS within UTM. Overall, this                 
document focuses on the requirements related to operation, not on the full            
requirements to gain an authority to operate. 
NASA makes the assumption that the airspace regulator will determine the           
classification of data that will be handled and exchanged within the USS Network and              
between USSs and FIMS. Likely this categorization will follow federal guidelines and            
leverage the initial step of the Risk Management Framework, as detailed in [FIPS199].             
At a high level, that document describes how to categorize data at one of three levels                
(low, medium, or high) on three axes (confidentiality, integrity, and availability).           
Information may be further categorized in terms of Personally Identifiable Information           
and privacy (which is different than confidentiality in that privacy exclusively focuses on             
information related to individuals). 
Short-cutting some of the details of the Risk Management Framework, this           
categorization process leads to a set of “controls” on an information system that can be               
translated into requirements, or formalized in other ways. For details on these controls             
and how they might be assured, [NIST800.53] and [NIST800.53A] are key references.            
Each USS would be required to show how they implement the various controls. It is               
valuable to note that some of the controls might be met through proper implementation              
of certain requirements herein. For example if timestamping and clock synchronization           
1 Depending on how discovery and other elements are defined within a deployment of UTM,               
every USS’s LUN will be different. Consider the relationship ‘~’ where ‘~’ means “has in its                
LUN.” For example, “USS A has in its LUN USS B” implies “USS B has in its LUN USS A.” This                     
makes the relationship symmetric. However “USS A has in its LUN USS A” is NOT true since it                  
would lead to implications of USS A needing to communicate with itself to satisfy the               
requirements of this document. So, the relationship is not reflexive. Finally, (USS A ~ USS B)                
and (USS B ~ USS C) does not imply that (USS A ~ USS C), thus the relationship is not                    
transitive. It is uncommon to find real-world relations that are not reflexive, not transitive, but               
are symmetric, thus this observation deserves a footnote. 
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 are implemented as required in this document, that may satisfy control number AU-8 in              
[NIST800.53] (“Timestamps”), depending on the bounds placed on synchronized time          
via that control. 
In addition, many of the controls in the “Access Control” section of [NIST800.53] will be               
met through proper implementation of authentication and authorization as described in           
[UTMAuth]. 
So while this document does not attempt to align directly with the Risk Management              
Framework, it should be expected by stakeholders that USSs will be authorized only             
after satisfaction of a Risk Management Framework process. Appendix G of           
[NIST800.37r2] entitled “AUTHORIZATION BOUNDARY CONSIDERATIONS:     
COMPLEX SYSTEMS, APPLICATIONS, AND THE EFFECTS OF CHANGING        
TECHNOLOGIES,” describes the unique considerations of services provided by         
non-federal organizations on behalf of the government. The following excerpt from that            
section of NIST800.37r2] highlights the issues and considerations that arise in a            
proposed system like UTM where USSs are providing services under the purview of a              
federal agency: 
While the concepts of external systems and external service providers are           
not new, the current pervasiveness and frequency of their invocation can           
present organizations with significant, new challenges. There are        
instances where system elements, subsystems, or perhaps the entire         
system may be outside of the direct control of the organization that            
authorizes its operation…. FISMA and OMB policy require external         
providers that process, store, or transmit federal information or operate          
information systems on behalf of the federal government to meet the same            
security and privacy requirements as federal agencies. Federal security         
and privacy requirements also apply to external systems storing,         
processing, or transmitting federal information and any services provided         
by or associated with the external system. 
As an initial requirement in this regard, this specification provides a single, high-level             
requirement: 
[UTM-USS-001] A USS MUST meet the requirements of the authorizing entity for            
authority to operate as a USS. 
To finalize this portion of this specification document, a final highlight related to             
internationalization is provided. The UTM Project would like to continue promoting           
international harmonization, so the reliance upon NIST documentation, if not          
acceptable to an ANSP, should not be a hindrance to adoption. NIST offers a mapping               
to ISO standards, including some gap analysis of that mapping. 
11 
  
 
6. API Requirements 
Data exchange and, by extension, overall operation of the UTM System, is governed by              
a set of published Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). These APIs are the            
normative documents for formatting data, defining Internet endpoints, and specifying          
transfer protocols. This document serves to define requirements not easily captured in            
the APIs. Whenever possible, this specification defers to the most current applicable            
API. If there is a discrepancy between this specification and an API specification, the              
API specification will be given preference. 
The API documentation is provided in a format such that code may be generated from               
the API.  Currently the format is [OpenAPIv2.0]. 
[UTM-USS-002] All data exchanges via UTM APIs MUST be completed over a            
TLS-secured connection.  
[UTM-USS-003] All TLS implementations for UTM data exchanges MUST conform to           
the most recent version of NIST 800-52.  
As of this writing, the most current version of NIST 800-52 is a draft for revision 2                 
[NIST800.52v2]. Details related to the keys and certificates used in establishing such            
TLS connections are deferred to [UTMAuth]. 
The following is a brief overview of the APIs relevant to the USS Network. 
6.1. FIMS-USS API 
The [FIMSUSS-API] defines FIMS-specific data exchanges to FIMS from any USS.           
FIMS also implements the [USSREQ-API], but reserves the right to provide HTTP 40X             
status code responses for certain exchanges that are not applicable to FIMS. This             
approach allows USS implementers to interact with FIMS using the same endpoint            
names and models as they use to communicate with each other.  
[UTM-USS-004] A USS MUST communicate with FIMS per the [FIMSUSS-API] and the            
[USSREQ-API]. 
6.2. USS-USS API 
The [USSREQ-API] defines the required interfaces that each USS (or USS Instance)            
must support to allow interoperability within the USS Network and focuses on data             
exchange between USSs. See [UTMGlossary] for a formal definition of a USS            
Instance.  
[UTM-USS-005] A USS MUST communicate with other USSs per the [USSREQ-API]. 
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6.3. FIMS Authorization API 
The [FIMSAuthzAPI] provides the interface definition to authorization services for FIMS           
and USSs within the UTM System. This is an OAuth 2.0-based system as initially              
defined in [RFC6749]. The UTM-specific design choices within the OAuth 2.0           
framework are described partly within this specification and more completely in the            
[FIMSAuthzAPI] documentation. The latter is considered the official source in the case            
of any discrepancies in documentation.  
[UTM-USS-006] A USS MUST use the [FIMSAuthzAPI] for authorization purposes with           
other USSs. 
[UTM-USS-007] A USS MUST use the [FIMSAuthzAPI] for authorization purposes with           
FIMS. 
6.3. Public Safety API 
The [PUBSAFEAPI] provides the interface definition to support public safety          
functionality within the USS Network. This includes support of networked Remote ID .  2
[UTM-USS-008] A USS MUST implement the [PUBSAFEAPI]. 
7. Software Engineering Requirements 
This section collects general software engineering requirements for USS         
implementation. 
7.1. Random Numbers 
Random numbers are a part of other requirements described in this document.            
[NIST800.90A.R1] describes methods of Deterministic Random Bit Generation and         
[NIST800.90A.R1.LIST] provides a list of validated implementations adhering to those          
methods.  
[UTM-USS-009] When generating a random number for any purpose within the UTM            
System, a USS MUST use a method adhering to the recommendations in            
[NIST800.90A.R1].  
Another informative reference is [RFC4086] (Randomness Requirements for Security)         
which describes Best Current Practices (as of 2005) in this regard. 
2 Note that the support for RemoteID may be considered a separate service that is not required                 
for a nominal USS to directly support. If the decision to define RemoteID and potentially public                
safety functionality as separate services, then this section and associated requirement may be             
struck. 
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7.3. UUID Generation 
The generation of Universally Unique Identifiers (UUIDs) is a necessary part of a USS              
operation.  
[UTM-USS-010] When generating a UUID, a USS MUST generate a version 4 UUID as              
per [RFC4122]. 
Note that this requirement implies that the UUID is appropriately randomized and,            
therefore, will not be intentionally reused for any operational purpose. In some cases,             
known or repeated UUIDs aid in testing, but this use of UUIDs should be made clear to                 
all participants in such testing. 
7.4. JSON Data 
Data exchanges within the UTM System are primarily accomplished via JavaScript           
Object Notation (JSON)-defined data schemas. The specific schemas will be provided           
to stakeholders as [OpenAPIv2] specifications whenever possible. The [OpenAPIv2]         
specification references the [RFC8259] (though it does so as a previous version,            
[JSONSpec]), but may redefine or add certain terms. As such, when schemas are             
described using [OpenAPIv2], that specification will be the defining reference. At times            
where JSON is used outside of an [OpenAPIv2] description, the [RFC8259] will be the              
defining reference. 
For clarity, the following requirements re-write and solidify JSON requirements from           
[RFC8259] that might be read as design decisions if taken as-is from that specification. 
[UTM-USS-011] JSON text exchanged between USSs MUST be encoded using UTF-8. 
[UTM-USS-012] JSON text exchanged between a USS and FIMS MUST be encoded            
using UTF-8. 
UTF-8 (or Universal Transformation Format-8) is a text encoding standard described in            
detail in [RFC3629]. In the JSON standard, [RFC8259], this requirement of UTF-8 is             
written with the caveat that this encoding is required when the “systems are not part of                
a closed ecosystem.” Thus, the requirements are stated here to avoid ambiguity. In             
addition, since the JSON specification has a “MAY” statement in that same section, that              
statement is hardened into a requirement for USS communication purposes here: 
[UTM-USS-013] A USS MUST treat the presence of a byte order mark as a malformed               
data exchange. 
For any exchange of JSON-formatted data, the receiver MAY ignore any fields that are              
supplied by the sender that are not included in the relevant schema definition. 
[UTM-USS-014] For any exchange of JSON-formatted data, the receiver MUST reply           
with an HTTP 400 status code whenever any required field (as specified in the relevant               
schema definition) of the received data is missing.  
14 
 [UTM-USS-015] If malformed data are received via a RESTful call, the receiver MUST             
reply with an HTTP 400 status code. 
An authoritative definition for “malformed” was not found by the authors, despite the             
term being regularly used in many computer science contexts. There are definitions            
available for well-formed, so malformed may be considered “not well-formed.” The           
simplest definition for “malformed” might be: data that do not meet the expected             
protocol or formatting. For example, data supplied as JSON but not using UTF-8             
encoding should be considered “malformed” data. 
[UTM-USS-016] A USS MUST NOT reject JSON due to the ordering of fields within the               
JSON.  
This follows from the definition in [RFC8259] of a JSON object: 
An object is an unordered collection of zero or more name/value pairs, where a 
name is a string and a value is a string, number, boolean, null, object, or array. 
as well as the following note in [RFC8259] related to interoperability: 
 
 
JSON parsing libraries have been observed to differ as to whether or not they 
make the ordering of object members visible to calling software. 
Implementations whose behavior does not depend on member ordering will be 
interoperable in the sense that they will not be affected by these differences. 
 
7.5. Units of Measure 
[UTM-USS-017] A USS MUST adhere to API specifications related to units of            
measure and their formatting. 
These units will include measurements for speed, distance, altitude, weight, time and            
other elements. In many cases, metadata related to precision will be specified in the              
API documentation as well. Details on particular units are intentionally unavailable in            
this document in order to defer to the authoritative API documentation. Any            
discrepancy between this document and API documentation defers to the latter. 
7.5.1. Date-Time Format 
All date-time values exchanged within the USS Network will use [ISO8601] for            
formatting guidance. 
[UTM-USS-018] A USS MUST use UTC time for all date-times exchanged with other             
USSs.  
[UTM-USS-019] A USS MUST use UTC time for all date-times exchanged with            
FIMS.  
15 
  
[UTM-USS-020] All date-times supplied by a USS to another USS MUST follow the             
format pattern YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm:ss.sssZ.  
[UTM-USS-021] All date-times supplied by a USS to FIMS MUST follow the format             
pattern YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm:ss.sssZ.  
[UTM-USS-022] A USS MUST verify that time strings have the format           
YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm:ss.sssZ.  
According to [ISO8601], the three fractional decimal places for seconds corresponds           
to millisecond accuracy. That specification does not mention the term "precision,"           
thus this specification avoids use of the term "precision" for these date-time values             
as well. Note that a USS may have human-interface systems that display times in              
other formats and such design decisions are not in conflict with this specification.             
Also note that the API requirements listed earlier combined with these date-time            
formatting requirements imply that a USS will reject any data submission that            
includes date-times that do not follow the correct formatting. 
It bears noting that interoperability is non-trivial if such prescriptive formatting is not             
provided to USSs. [ISO8601] is a standard, but it provides for many design             
decisions and great flexibility. Leaving too many options provides several avenues           
for issues with parsers, libraries, interpretations and other elements that may affect            
interoperability. 
 7.5.2. Altitudes  
[UTM-USS-023] All altitudes within UTM MUST be in reference to World Geodetic            
System 1984 [WGS 84].  
[UTM-USS-024] To convert between feet and meters, the USS MUST use a factor of              
0.3048 m/ft.  
This conforms to the definition of an "international yard" as discussed in            
[FRDoc59-5442], and is therefore used to define the "international foot." This           
conversion is necessary given the default units of meters within WGS 84 and to              
provide improved interoperability within the U.S. National Airspace System (NAS).          
This conversion may also aid integration with other systems relying on metric units. 
Note that many related systems and maps rely on Above Ground Level (AGL) and              
Mean Sea Level (MSL) measures. Many UAS utilize height above takeoff location            
for some functions. Given these practices for which there are no standard            
established procedures for small UAS operations, the USS Specification aims to           
minimize confusion and ambiguity at the potential cost of translation. The overall            
goal is to ensure that data exchanged within the USS Network is as unambiguous as               
possible. However, given that there will be translations to get to and from WGS84,              
further requirements for altitude reporting are required for the USS Network. These            
will include, but are not limited to, how and which elevation models are used as well                
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as conversion methods for AGL and Mean Sea Level to WGS84. Discrepancies can             
cause safety hazards​tbd_alt​. 
7.6. Time Synchronization 
A common reference to time is of high importance within the USS Network and within               
UTM as a whole. The time synchronization solution within UTM will be determined             
through further discussions and research. Expect further requirements in future          
releases of this document​ ​tbd_time​. 
Due to the unresolved issues with time synchronization, USSs will need to restrict             
how they use timestamps from other systems. The [USSREQ-API] provides          
requirements on various timestamps. In general, these requirements focus on the           
internal consistency of a given instance of a particular model. More concretely, an             
example of these requirements might be ensuring that a pair of timestamps are             
ordered properly, such as a ​time_measured and a ​time_submitted pair may           
have a requirement in the API that ​time_measured ​<= ​time_submitted ​.          
However there is no requirement that a USS receiving such an instance of a model               
needs to check those timestamps against any of its own internal clocks. So the              
receiving USS cannot reject data if is seems that times are inconsistent with its own               
time. 
8. USS Network 
This section collects requirements for successful integration of a USS within the USS             
Network. 
8.1. USS Authorization 
Requirements related to Public Key Infrastructure, identity management,        
authentication, authorization, and related topics will be deferred to a separate           
document, "UTM Authentication and Authorization Framework" [UTMAuth]. This leads         
to the generalized requirement:  
[UTM-USS-025] A USS MUST adhere to the requirements described in [UTMAuth]. 
The [FIMSAuthzAPI] allows for the request of access tokens to use in communications             
within the USS Network. Tokens can be re-used by the authorized party as many              
times as necessary prior to their expiration. Excessive token requests to the FIMS             
Authorization Server may have detrimental effects on the server, impacting          
performance of the USS Network as a whole. Thus, USSs need to implement various              
best practices in relation to token use and re-use. The following requirement            
encourages re-use of tokens while they are still valid.  
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[UTM-USS-026] A USS MUST NOT request tokens with duplicate parameters while it            
is in possession of a valid token with those parameters and a valid use time of at least                  
50% of its initial valid use time.  
The “valid use time” in the requirement refers to the difference between the issue and               
expiration time. Thus if there is a valid use time of 30 minutes at time of issue, then                  
that token should be reused (assuming it is still known to be secure) for at least 15                 
minutes before requesting another token with the same parameters. The phrase “with            
the same parameters” can be interpreted as having, say, the same scope and audience              
values. Essentially if the values in the token would allow access to a given resource,               
then it should be reused until at least half of its life is gone. Note that this does not                   
prevent the request of multiple tokens at once, as long as they each provide different               
types of authorization (for example different scopes and audiences) with the USS            
Network. 
[UTM-USS-027] A USS MUST ensure that its access tokens stored on its systems are              
inaccessible to external entities. 
[UTM-USS-028] A USS MUST remove all traces of another USS’s valid access token             
from its systems after the token serves its purpose of authorizing appropriate access.  
This requirement is intended to ensure that a USS is not storing another USS’s tokens,               
as they have no legitimate value to any USS other than the USS to which the token                 
was originally issued, and to guard against abuse of token usage. Thus, it is best to                
ensure that tokens are not available for abuse in the first place. 
8.2. USS Discovery 
The concept of discovery amongst USSs and FIMS is an active area of research and               
development . This specification will defer discovery requirements to a future          3
document and will add this placeholder requirement: 
[UTM-USS-029] A USS MUST adhere to the requirements for discovery as described            
in [UTMDisc]. 
3 For historical reference, the NASA UTM Project recognized the need for a discovery system               
when the UTM architecture evolved to a federated system of USSs. NASA tested a simple               
discovery system in flight testing for TCL2. In TCL3, Project Wing (under Google’s parent              
company, Alphabet) introduced an industry-defined discovery mechanism called “InterUSS.”         
NASA requested additional features and requirements from Wing to make it suitable for TCL4              
testing and that updated system was used for TCL4 flight testing. Based on the initial (“main                
line”) InterUSS system and the experience and features of NASA’s TCL4 version, the InterUSS              
platform as been upgraded and moved to a project under the Linux Foundation with broader               
industry support and more independent stewardship. The system has been demonstrated after            
TCL4 in Europe and in the U.S. by multiple industry partners. The standardization efforts              
underway are expected to make use of the InterUSS approach to discovery. 
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8.3. Response Performance 
Several requirements in this document have a “deadline clause” indicating how quickly            
a USS needs to respond to certain requests. It may be more appropriate to add an                
additional performance clause to any requirement with a deadline clause. For           
example, a requirement that reads: “A USS MUST respond to event X within one              
second,” likely should be written as “A USS MUST respond to event X within one               
second ​at least 95% of the time.” This additional performance clause helps account for               
latency and other issues that may affect distributed systems, but further specification is             
reserved for future formalization of this specification​tbd_qos​. This note applies to all            
requirements with deadlines contained in this document. It may also be reasonable to             
consider a parallel requirement for each of these deadline requirements using the 99th             
percentile and a longer deadline. 
9. Operator Support 
The major role of a USS is to support UAS operators in performing their missions. To                
be a USS implies at least a minimal level of functionality provided to UAS operators. A                
USS is considered to be supporting an operation from the time the USS submits an               
authorization announcement or notification to FIMS and the USS Network on behalf of             
that operation. This support continues until well after the operation is completed or             
cancelled in that the USS can be asked for historical data on that operation​ ​tbd_logging​. 
[UTM-USS-030] A USS MUST protect an operator's Personally Identifiable Information          
(PII) from unlawful and/or unintended disclosure. 
Discussion and definition of PII is deferred to [NIST800.122]. Even though that            
document focuses on the US Federal definition of PII and its existence within federal              
systems, the document can be reasonably applied to UTM-specific data that may            
potentially exist on and exchanged between non-federal systems. 
[UTM-USS-031] Prior to a non-hobbyist operation, a USS MUST ensure the vehicle            
designated for an Operation it is supporting is properly registered.  
Note that USSs are not required to check the registration of vehicles supported by              
other USSs. In addition, it may be reasonable to assume that a USS would not be able                 
to check the registration of vehicles supported by other USSs in nominal cases, as              
doing so would likely require a higher level of access to that registration system than is                
provided to a nominal USS. 
[UTM-USS-032] A USS MUST ensure that a UAS operator's plan conforms to            
published airspace rules and regulations.  
This will likely involve checking all elements of the plan and its components against an               
appropriate FAA rule or set of rules. For informative purposes, the following might be              
the types of checks that a USS performs for an operation plan (this list is not intended                 
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 to be exhaustive and may not completely align with current rules and is for              
illustrative/discussion purposes only): 
● A UAS operator intends to fly as a hobbyist (a.k.a. Part 101E) operation. The              
USS should check (amongst other things) that it is visual line of sight (VLOS),              
non-commercial, and whether it is or is not within five miles of an airport. 
● A UAS operator intends to fly as a Part 107 operation. The USS should check               
(amongst other things) that the operation is VLOS, in Class G and/or            
designated airspace, and has a remote pilot in command (RPIC) with           
appropriate credentials. 
● A UAS operator intends to fly as an operation under a future FAA rule: The USS                
should check all aspects of the operation to ensure it meets the requirements of              
the rule. 
For certain types of operations under certain FAA rules (TBD), a USS might need to               
report the current state and position of the operation to a requesting party (another              
USS or FIMS/Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP), for example).  
[UTM-USS-033] A USS MUST supply a position report from within the last 2 seconds              
for any non-hobbyist operation supported by that USS within 1 second of receiving an              
authorized request for that position. 
Note that this document uses "position report" as a standalone set of data elements              
describing a single position exchanged in a single transaction, while "position tracking"            
as a set of position reports for a single operation provided in a single transaction               
(potentially a pub-sub transaction over a period of time) or over multiple transactions.             
Note that the ability to provide position tracking of hobbyist and Part 107 operations is               
not required, but the ability to provide position tracking of Part 107X operations is              
required. Further details on position reporting are provided in the ​Position Reports            
section. 
[UTM-USS-034] When requested, a USS MUST supply operation information to the           
requesting operator associated with that operation.  
This requirement is related to the operator's right to access data related to its operation               
as it is being shared within the UTM System and is being stored by the USS. Note that                  
this requirement exists since the view of an operation is likely quite different depending              
on perspective (operator vs. USS, for example). 
[UTM-USS-035] A USS MUST offer a mechanism to receive messages related to            
in-flight emergencies from a supported operation.  
[UTM-USS-036] A USS MUST acknowledge a message related to an in-flight           
emergency from a supported operation.  
An acknowledgement MAY be an appropriate HTTP status code response to the            
message​. ​Note that an operation that is reporting an in-flight emergency may actually             
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be conforming with its plan and would not necessarily be in any other state than               
ACTIVATED (see ​State Maintenance​ and ​In-flight Emergency​ sections). 
A globally unique flight identifier (GUFI) serves to uniquely identify an operation within             
UTM and, potentially, throughout the NAS as a whole. A GUFI is a UUID, which aids                
interoperability with the Flight Information Exchange Model. Specifically, note the          
formatting definition​ of a GUFI in the ​FIXM​ 4.1 schema.  
[UTM-USS-037] A USS MUST assign a GUFI as a UUIDv4 for each supported             
operation.  
[UTM-USS-038] A USS MUST keep a GUFI constant once assigned to an operation.  
It is acceptable to alter non-GUFI data per the appropriate APIs or to develop a new                
operation with the appropriate data while closing the previous operation. Operations           
with different GUFIs will be assumed to be different operations. 
There will be mechanisms to allow insight into the health of a USS to aid in monitoring                 
expected Quality of Service (QoS) requirements. This is deferred to the           
[USSREQ-API] which is already a requirement for implementation. Note the endpoints           
for such monitoring are not currently defined in the [USSREQ-API], but would be             
needed in an operational system. 
9.1. State Maintenance 
A USS is responsible for maintaining a current record of the state of an operation.  
[UTM-USS-039] A USS MUST report the valid state of an operation within 2 seconds of               
receiving a valid request for that state.  
There may be future requirements on logging/persisting all state transitions for an            
operation and maintaining those logs for some period of time. There are currently six              
states for operations that are recognized in communications between USSs and FIMS.            
These states are defined in the following table: 
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 Table 1. UAS Operation States. 
Operation State Definition 
PROPOSED The UAS Operation has become known outside of its own USS but there are 
requirements to operate that have not yet been met. This is a time-limited 
state. 
ACCEPTED The UAS Operation has become known outside of its own USS. The 
assumption of all stakeholders upon learning of a new ACCEPTED 
operation is that it meets all requirements to enter the airspace. 
ACTIVATED The UAS Operation is active and adhering to its requirements in accessing 
the airspace. The UAS Operation may or may not be airborne. 
NONCONFORMING The UAS Operation was ACTIVATED, but is not adhering to its 
requirements in accessing the airspace. 
ROGUE The UAS Operation is no longer authorized in the airspace and must safely 
exit the airspace as quickly as practical. The UAS may not be under positive 
control. 
CLOSED The UAS Operation is no longer flying and will not fly again. 
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 The following state diagram is informative of the acceptable state transitions: 
 
Figure 2. UAS Operation State Diagram. 
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[UTM-USS-040] A USS MUST maintain the state of an operation as ACCEPTED at all              
times from announcing it via the UTM APIs until an event causes a transition to another                
state.  
[UTM-USS-041] A USS MUST maintain the state of an operation as ACTIVATED at all              
times after the start time of its first operation volume until it is closed while it is in                  
conformance with its plan and the rules of the airspace.  
Note that an operation is considered "active" from the begin time for its first operation               
volume until it is in the CLOSED state. Using this definition, an operation may be               
"active" but not in the ACTIVATED state due to, say, non-conformance or other issues. 
[UTM-USS-042] A USS MUST transition an operation to the CLOSED state when it is              
no longer flying and will not fly again. 
[UTM-USS-043] A USS MUST announce any transition to the CLOSED state to its             
LUN. 
Small UAS operations may frequently land and takeoff. They may also swap batteries             
and perform other maintenance during an operation. To meet the position and state             
reporting requirements, a USS would need to account for these activities during an             
operation. A specific example highlighting potential complexity would be the battery           
swap during an operation. During the swap, telemetry from the UA to the GCS would               
not be available, thus interrupting the typical flow of positions from UAS to USS. But               
the USS may receive a request for the operation position during this time, so the USS                
would need some method to appropriately reply. 
9.2. Conformance Monitoring 
A USS is responsible for monitoring the conformance of UAS operations under its             
management. The level of management depends on the type of operation (hobbyist,            
Part 107, or Part 107X). Based on the mission of the UAS operator, the USS defines                
two sets of volumes. The first is a set of Conformance Volumes. At any given time, an                 
operation is expected to be contained within at least one valid Conformance Volume.             
When defining this set of volumes, the USS should aid the UAS operator, perhaps by               
building off of the operator's planned flight path or mission description. In Figure 3, this               
is depicted with the “Flight Volume” box, but this can be any reasonable representation              
for the operator and the USS (waypoints, volumes, trajectories, etc.), with the key being              
that what the operator is planning to do is within a Conformance Volume. Again, the               
expectation of all stakeholders within UTM is that any operation is maintained within at              
least one valid Conformance Volume at all times. Each Conformance Volume is            
contained (four-dimensionally) within an Operation Volume. It is the set of Operation            
Volumes that is included as part of the Operation data supplied to other UTM              
components via the appropriate APIs. The USS should make an effort to size these              
volumes such that the impact on other users of the airspace is minimized. There will be                
requirements on the maximum 4D dimensions of Operation Volumes and Conformance           
Volumes ​tbd_vols​. A conformance volume is not communicated during any phase of a             
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 nominal operation with FIMS or other USSs. Conformance Volumes may be requested            
by the ANSP in conjunction with an audit or investigation. The discussion in this              
paragraph supports the following requirements:  
[UTM-USS-044] A USS MUST define a Conformance Volume for each Operation           
Volume for each operation.  
[UTM-USS-045] A Conformance Volume MUST be contained in all four dimensions           
within its associated Operation Volume. 
 
Figure 3. Relationship of various volumes and state transitions. 
An operation may become NONCONFORMING for reasons other than breaking its           
planned volumes. This is the definition currently provided by the [UTMGlossary], which            
may evolve as the overall UTM concept evolves: 
Conformance: 
A property of a UAS operation denoting adherence to the submitted plan, the rules 
of the airspace, and the required data exchanges during operation. Specific, 
non-comprehensive requirements for maintaining conformance are as follows: 
1. Staying within conformance volumes. 
2. Submitting position reports at required rate. 
3. Responding to required information requests from USS. 
4. Meeting agreed requirements for operation. Examples 
(non-comprehensive): 
a. Surveillance coverage 
b. Weather limits 
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 c. Visibility condition 
When an operation is no longer in conformance, that operation is deemed            
nonconforming and will be placed in the NONCONFORMING state by the USS.            
NONCONFORMING operations should be a rare event. ROGUE operations should be           
even rarer! The USS is critical in ensuring that operators understand their Operation             
Volumes and necessity of staying within them, including the need to stay within their              
Conformance Volumes to minimize the number of NONCONFORMING operations. In          
addition, the rate of NONCONFORMING and ROGUE operations managed by a USS            
may become part of the QoS metrics for a USS. 
All of the "announcements" described through the end of this subsection imply following             
the current, relevant API documentation (specifically, the [FIMSUSS-API] and the          
[USSREQ-API]). 
[UTM-USS-046] A USS MUST be aware within 1 second that an operation under its              
management is out of conformance.  
Through testing, the value of 1 second will be validated or updated in future versions of                
this document​ ​tbd_timeconform​. This requirement may be achieved through: 
● regular position reporting, 
● a messaging system between the USS and operators, 
● some other means. 
[UTM-USS-047] The USS MUST maintain a record of the state of a nonconforming             
operation as NONCONFORMING.  
Note that some ways of entering the NONCONFORMING state will not be immediately             
knowable by the USS (weather limits, visibility conditions, etc.). There may be future             
requirements on how aware a USS needs to be aware of such operational elements              
tbd_conformawareness​. 
[UTM-USS-048] A USS MUST announce to its LUN a NONCONFORMING operation           
within 2 seconds of transitioning an operation into the NONCONFORMING state.  
[UTM-USS-049] A USS MUST announce to its LUN within 2 seconds of transitioning an              
operation into the ACTIVATED state from the NONCONFORMING state. 
[UTM-USS-050] A USS MUST designate the state of an operation that has been in the               
NONCONFORMING state for 30 continuous seconds as ROGUE.  
[UTM-USS-051] A USS MUST designate the state of an operation that has transitioned             
to the NONCONFORMING state more than 3 times as ROGUE.  
This requirement is in place due to the operation demonstrating its inability to adhere to               
its assigned conformance geography.  
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[UTM-USS-052] A USS MUST designate the state of an operation that is not contained              
within at least one of its Operation Volumes as ROGUE. 
This requirement emphasizes the importance of an operator staying within its           
Conformance Volumes, and failing that, ensuring the operation does not breach the            
collection of Operation Volumes. 
[UTM-USS-053] A USS MUST announce to its LUN a ROGUE operation within 2             
seconds of transitioning that operation to the ROGUE state.  
A USS may transition an operation to the ACTIVATED or CLOSED states from the              
NONCONFORMING state when the operation meets the requirements of those state           
definitions.  
[UTM-USS-054] A USS MUST NOT transition a ROGUE operation to any state other             
than CLOSED.  
[UTM-USS-055] The USS MUST change the state of a ROGUE operation to CLOSED             
when that operation has ceased operating and not before it has ceased operating.  
Essentially this pair of requirements implies that a ROGUE operation has no option             
other than to become CLOSED (see Figure 2). ​A ROGUE operation may instigate             
reactions from other stakeholders on the ground and in the air. It is not reasonable to                
allow such an operation to return to a nominal state given the potential side effects of                
that operation becoming ROGUE. 
There is one important follow-up note regarding the definition of a Conformance            
Volume. Given that Part 107 and hobbyist operations are not required to report             
positions to the USS, it may be challenging to know when or if such an operation                
becomes NONCONFORMING. It might be that the Conformance Volumes are equal to            
the Operation Volumes (geographically speaking). In this case, an operation could not            
become NONCONFORMING due to a volume-related violation; it would immediately          
become ROGUE if it left its Conformance/Operation Volume. This concept should be            
carefully considered by the USS when determining how it supports its operators and             
how that support is explained to its operators. 
9.3. Contingency Management 
Per the [USSREQ-API], an Operation contains a set of Contingency Plans. The            
Contingency Plan provides a preflight method to communicate how various unplanned           
situations might be handled by an operation. Each plan lists a non-empty set of events               
or conditions, each with a single contingency response.  
[UTM-USS-056] A USS MUST provide at least one Contingency Plan per Operation            
Volume within an Operation plan as defined per the [USSREQ-API].  
[UTM-USS-057] When a Contingency Plan is put into action, the USS MUST post a              
message containing the Contingency Plan to each USS in its LUN.  
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 [UTM-USS-058] A USS MUST update the LUN via a message when any Contingency             
Plan ends or changes.  
If an update to the operation plan is needed to support a contingency plan (e.g., a                
"return to base" may require updated operation volumes and/or times), then the USS             
will support such planning through the existing facilities and requirements described in            
this document. The following sequence diagram (Figure 4) is informative of the            
expected communications between stakeholders: 
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Figure 4. Contingency Management for a Single Operation. 
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10. UAS Volume Reservations 
A UAS Volume Reservation (UVR) is a 4-dimensional volume with additional properties            
that affect UAS operations by limiting access to that 4-dimensional volume. Currently,            
the [USSREQ-API] defines an endpoint for new UVRs to be posted to a USS. These               
could be constraints that are generated by some other entity in the NAS that are               
communicated via FIMS or constraints that are generated by another USS with the             
appropriate role. Thus USSs that are currently active will receive data regarding UVRs             
that may affect their supported operations. The entity that provides the original            
announcement for a UVR will be available to query for UVR details. This is useful for                
USSs that come online or become active in a new geographic region after the initial               
UVR announcement. The USS Discovery document or future FAA or NASA concept            
documents may provide additional insight or requirements in regard to UVRs, thus            
beyond the references to UVRs in the [USSREQ-API], the concept and requirements            
will be deferred to those future documents​tbd_uvrs​. The FAA-NASA UTM Pilot Program            
tested the concept of UVRs, and results from that testing will likely inform future              
requirements. 
11. Priority Operations  
Certain UAS operations in the UTM airspace may be designated as priority operations.             
Operations that are not priority operations are designated as nominal operations.           
Currently, there are two types of priority operation: emergencies and public safety.            
Priority operations have a severity level assigned to them. These levels are defined in              
the APIs and allow for ranking of priority operations. There is no difference in ranking               
inherently between emergencies and public safety operations; they are only          
differentiated (in terms of conflict management) by their assigned severity levels. A            
priority operation is of higher priority than each nominal operation. One priority            
operation is of higher priority if its severity level is higher. 
The two types of priority operations are described in the subsections below. An             
operation of higher priority will force a change in the operational plans of lower priority               
when their plans intersect.  
[UTM-USS-059] A USS MUST define and announce an updated, deconflicted          
operation plan for an operation that intersects another operation of higher priority within             
30 seconds of the announcement of the higher priority operation. 
See Negotiation section for more information. 
11.1. In-flight Emergency  
Any USS can designate an operation under its management as being in an in-flight              
emergency state. Note that this state is separate from the regular operation state             
discussed above. An operation can be in the ACTIVATED, NONCONFORMING, or           
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ROGUE states and also be in or out of an in-flight emergency state. Until there are                
more specific definitions of an in-flight emergency for sUAS, UTM refers to the NAS              
definition of an in-flight emergency for manned aviation: An in-flight emergency is a             
distress or urgency condition. The [FAAGlossary] defines an urgency condition as           
"being concerned about safety and of requiring timely but not immediate assistance; a             
potential distress condition" while a distress is defined as "a condition of being             
threatened by serious and/or imminent danger and of requiring immediate assistance."           
Typically the pilot in command (PIC), or RPIC in UTM's case, makes this determination.              
In UTM, the USS may make this determination on the RPIC's behalf. If the RPIC or the                 
USS determines an operation is in an in-flight emergency (distress or urgency            
condition), the USS will need to notify appropriate stakeholders.  
[UTM-USS-060] A USS MUST send a message to its LUN when an in-flight emergency              
is determined for an operation under its management.  
[UTM-USS-061] A message describing an operation in an urgency condition MUST           
denote a severity level lower than EMERGENCY according to the UTM API            
documentation.  
[UTM-USS-062] A message describing an operation in a distress condition MUST           
denote a severity level of EMERGENCY. 
[UTM-USS-063] A USS MUST update the operation plan of an operation under its             
management that enters or exits an in-flight emergency state.  
This update will include an appropriate setting of the priority elements based on the              
type of in-flight emergency and will update the operation volumes to accommodate the             
emergency, if necessary. A USS should ensure that an operation does not enter the              
NONCONFORMING or ROGUE states while handling an in-flight emergency. 
A useful reference for off-nominal situations from the operator perspective is           
[UTM-OffNominal]. Additional requirements and discussion for off-nominal operations        
are provided in the Accounting and Auditing section below. 
11.2. Public Safety  
A USS may complete additional checkout steps to earn a public safety USS role. These               
steps are TBD, however they may include higher levels of QoS, documentation of a              
process to vet and handle public safety personnel, and additional assurances of ethical             
behavior in the UTM airspace, amongst other requirements. 
Upon earning the public safety role, a USS may then accept public safety operations              
from public safety operators (e.g., police, firefighting, emergency medical services).          
Public safety operations have a higher priority than regular operations. However, note            
that not all operations submitted by a public safety operator are priority operations. In              
other words, a public safety operator may choose to submit regular operations as well              
as public safety operations. 
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12. USS-USS Communication 
Collaboration is a key feature of the UTM System. To successfully collaborate, the             
communication between USSs is described here.  
The [USSREQ-API] standardizes the expectations of the communication mechanisms         
to be provided by each USS such as the endpoints and the data models. This section                
helps describe more requirements on HOW to use the API. 
12.1. Operation Announcements 
[UTM-USS-064] A USS MUST announce a new Operation via the [USSREQ-API] to all             
USSs that intersect that new Operation.  
Currently, this is achieved via an HTTP POST to the "/operations" endpoint of each of               
those intersecting USSs, though this document defers to the current [USSREQ-API] for            
the correct mechanism.  
[UTM-USS-065] A USS MUST announce modifications to an existing Operation via the            
[USSREQ-API] to all USS Instances that intersect the modified Operation.  
This requirement has several implications that an implementer needs to consider. First,            
the modification announcement might go to a USS that was not required to receive the               
initial announcement of that operation. Thus, if this is handled with an HTTP PUT to the                
"/operations" endpoint, that new USS would not necessarily have data to be modified             
by the PUT.  
Depending from which state the Operation transitions to CLOSED, there are specific            
severity levels that are required and described in the [USSREQ-API] and are not             
reprinted here to reduce potential documentation conflicts. 
12.2. Position Reports 
[UTM-USS-066] A USS MUST collect position updates from all ACTIVATED Part 107X            
operations that it manages.  
[UTM-USS-067] A USS MUST provide access to all Part 107X operation position            
updates from operations that it manages to FIMS upon request per the [USSREQ-API].  
[UTM-USS-068] A USS MUST provide access to position updates for a Part 107X             
operation that it manages (Operation A) to another USS upon request when that             
second USS has an active operation with an operation volume intersecting Operation            
A's operation volumes.  
If you have an operation crossing another USS's operation, you need to exchange             
position data with each other upon request. ​This document defers to [USSREQ-API] on             
how this is achieved. Currently this is achieved by a requesting USS to send a               
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message to another USS to "turn on" or "turn off" position reporting for a particular               
operation. Positions are provided as HTTP PUTs to the requesting USS at a frequency              
of 1Hz. Note that if the negotiation process described in the next section results in               
strategic deconfliction of the operations, there will be no intersection operation volumes            
from two separate operations. 
[UTM-USS-069] A USS MUST provide access to position updates (if available) for            
operations that it manages to its LUN for all operations in the ROGUE or              
NONCONFORMING states.  
12.3. Strategic Deconfliction 
Details and discussion of this section are deferred to [UTM-SD]. The requirements            
from that reference are supplied here for completeness. 
● A UTM Operation should be free of 4-D intersection with all other known UTM              
Operations prior to departure and this should be known as “Strategic           
Deconfliction” within UTM. The Strategic Deconfliction scheme: 
○ [UTM-CM.05] MUST have the 4-D non-intersection of operations as its          
primary objective. 
○ [UTM-CM.10] MUST be well-documented for the understanding of        
operators. 
○ [UTM-CM.12] MUST allow for inspection of decisions by operators upon          
request from operators to their supporting USS. 
○ [UTM-CM.15] MUST be supported by all USSs 
○ [UTM-CM.20] MUST be mandated by the airspace regulator. 
● Strategic Deconfliction needs a prioritization scheme for operations within UTM.          
The Prioritization scheme: 
○ [UTM-CM.25] MUST allow for preemption of operations with lower         
priority by those with higher priority. 
○ [UTM-CM.30] MUST be equivalently calculable by each USS given the          
same operation data. 
○ [UTM-CM.35] MUST be efficiently calculable by each USS given the          
same operation data. 
○ [UTM-CM.37] MUST be independently calculable by USSs given the         
same operation data. 
○ [UTM-CM.40] SHOULD be a function of operator, operation, airspace,         
and vehicle parameters. 
● Strategic Deconfliction needs an allowance for negotiating deconfliction of UTM          
operations. The Negotiation scheme: 
○ [UTM-CM.45] MUST minimize direct human interaction. 
○ [UTM-CM.50] MUST be facilitated via USSs. 
○ [UTM-CM.55] MUST be a finite process. 
● Strategic Deconfliction needs an allowance for intersecting UTM operations.         
Intersecting operators, via their USSs: 
○ [UTM-CM.60] MUST have preceded the decision to intersect with a          
negotiation process. 
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○ [UTM-CM.65] MUST each provide explicit acknowledgement to each        
other of the planned intersection of operation volumes when intersection          
is mutually decided. 
○ [UTM-CM.70] MUST each provide details to each other on the approach           
to a separation provision while in intersecting operation volumes when          
intersection is mutually decided. 
APIs to support Strategic Deconfliction, including negotiation, are part of the           
[USSREQ-API]. 
12.4. Information Sharing 
There might be future requirements for airspace information sharing between          
operators. The first approach will use a system as roughly described in [UREP] for              
sharing what are being called "UAS Reports." As a placeholder for future            
discussions​tbd_urep​ on this topic, the following requirements are provided:  
[UTM-USS-070] A USS MUST offer a method for operators with operations under that             
USS's management to report weather and air traffic observations. 
[UTM-USS-071] A USS MUST share reports regarding weather and air traffic as            
supplied by an operator, with other UTM stakeholders.  
[UTM-USS-072] A USS MUST provide a means for operators with operations under            
that USS's management to receive weather and air traffic observations from other            
stakeholders.  
To satisfy these requirements initially and in an interoperable way, a USS SHOULD             
use the [UREP-API]. In future versions of this document, pending discussions, that last             
statement may become a requirement and likely will be a requirement for USS             
checkout purposes. 
13. Accounting and Auditing 
This section contains a summary of the accounting and auditing requirements of a             
USS. These are related to the retention of operational data in terms of which data need                
to be stored for what period of time as well as who would be allowed access to those                  
data and under what circumstances. 
[UTM-USS-073] Prior to a non-hobbyist operation becoming ACTIVATED, a USS          
MUST obtain a digital signature of the most recent version of an operation plan by the                
RPIC for that operation.  
[UTM-USS-074] Prior to a non-hobbyist operation becoming ACTIVATED, a USS          
MUST obtain a digital signature of the most recent version of an operation plan by the                
vehicle for that operation.  
34 
 [UTM-USS-075] Prior to a non-hobbyist operation becoming ACTIVATED, a USS          
MUST obtain a copy of all operation authorizations, if any, under which that operation              
will be performed. 
The signing of an operation plan by a vehicle and an RPIC provides assurance that the                
resources noted within the operation plan are indeed the resources to be used in              
execution of the plan. This is a non-repudiation and data integrity step. RPICs will have               
confidence that plans are not altered after they have signed/agreed to serve as RPIC.              
UAS operators and USSs will have confidence that a RPIC will not be able to claim                
they were not part of the operation. Similar arguments can be made for the vehicle: all                
stakeholders will have confidence regarding the exact vehicle performing an operation.           
Note that plans can be transitioned to the ACCEPTED state before signing takes place              
as this allows for some last minute alterations in the involved parties to support a               
variety of use cases. The method for signing by RPICs and vehicles has not yet been                
determined​tbd_sign​. 
A USS will have requirements for storing logs of queries and connections to its              
systems. Requirements for formats and duration of archives will be determined in the             
future and will be updated in this specification​tbd_logging​. 
When an operation enters an off-nominal condition (which would include all           
NONCONFORMING and ROGUE operations), additional reporting will be necessary.         
For more discussion and definitions for off-nominal conditions, see [UTM-OffNominal]. 
[UTM-USS-076] A USS MUST obtain an off-nominal situation report from the operator            
for each ROGUE operation.  
[UTM-USS-077] A USS MUST obtain an off-nominal situation report from the operator            
for each operation that has an unplanned return to the launch location. 
[UTM-USS-078] A USS MUST obtain an off-nominal situation report from the operator            
for each operation that has an unplanned landing. 
[UTM-USS-079] A USS MUST obtain an off-nominal situation report from the operator            
for each operation that enters an unplanned loiter. 
The definition of “unplanned” in the previous requirements relates to the active            
operation plan at the time of the landing or at the time of the loiter. It is quite possible                   
in these cases that the operation goes ROGUE in the process of such a landing or                
loiter, but this is not necessarily the case. Thus, the separate requirements are             
needed. 
The separate requirements for unplanned landing ([UTM-USS-078]) and unplanned         
return to launch location ([UTM-USS-077]) stem from the way in which those landings             
may occur. For example manual versus automated or controlled versus uncontrolled.           
Through further discussion with stakeholders, these requirements may be refined and           
potentially collapsed or further expanded ​tbd_landing​. 
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[UTM-USS-080] A USS MUST obtain an off-nominal situation report from the operator            
for each operation results in the loss of the UA. 
The “loss of the UA” means either 
● a total loss of the vehicle due to a crash or hard landing, or 
● a vehicle that is unrecoverable due to its known or unknown landing location. 
[UTM-USS-081] Whenever a USS is required to obtain an off-nominal situation report            
from an operator, the USS MUST do so within 3 days of the operation completion​. 
[UTM-USS-082] A USS MUST obtain data from the operator's platform per a Data             
Management Plan. 
Formatting of off-nominal situation reports will be codified in the future and may allow              
for reporting multiple events in a single form, but currently the expectation is that for               
each requirement that is met above for an operation, there will be a unique off-nominal               
situation. So an operation that goes NONCONFORMING twice would submit two           
reports. An operation that suddenly loiters and then later in the operation goes             
NONCONFORMING would need to file two off-nominal situation reports. Again, this           
process will be developed further in the future to streamline as much as possible              
without losing potentially vital airspace safety information. 
Data management plan details will be published in a separate document in the future              
tbd_dmp​. 
14. USS Quality of Service 
A USS is a critical component in the UTM System. In some scenarios, the USS is a                 
safety-critical component. As such, there are requirements for overall QoS that need to             
be maintained by each USS Instance. This section captures those QoS elements not             
captured elsewhere in this document. The QoS measures and metrics will be defined in              
a future version of this document​ ​tbd_qos​.  Possible examples of QoS metrics include: 
1. Nonconforming operation rate per day/week/month 
2. Rogue operation rate per day/week/month 
3. Planned operation volume utilization rate (needs to be above some percentage) 
4. Message response latency 
5. Successful negotiations 
6. Intersecting volumes minimized 
7. Data quality metrics 
15. Authorization Revocation 
In the event that a USS is deemed to be out of specification, its ability to request                 
authorization tokens from FIMS-Authz may be revoked. This may occur if the service             
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provided by the USS is not meeting the QoS requirements. This may occur if the USS                
is not adhering the communication protocols within the USS Network. 
16. USS Checkout Process 
An organization interested in offering services as a USS within the UTM System needs              
to complete a checkout process. The requirements that are checked during this            
process are those that are included in this specification. Since each requirement is not              
necessarily a software-specific requirement, an entity can expect a combination of           
software testing of their USS implementation along with required supporting          
documentation and other artifacts. Upon successful completion of this checkout          
process, the organization will be recognized as a valid USS. An identity will be              
provisioned for the USS within the UTM System. That identity will be managed within              
FIMS. The checkout process is managed by the ANSP, but might be executed by an               
entity other than the ANSP, at the discretion of the ANSP. 
A potential flow to complete the checkout process may include the following steps for              
the interested entity: 
1. Review USS documentation. 
2. Implement USS per USS Specification. 
3. Test implementation using an existing "sandbox" environment (not currently in          
existence as of this writing). 
4. Apply for checkout process. 
5. Software checkout. 
6. Obtain identity information from ANSP/FIMS. 
Further detail or formalization is currently beyond the scope of this document. For             
some further insight on some of these steps, see [USSCheckout]. 
Step 6 above will follow [NIST800.63.3] Digital Identity Guidelines. USS identities in the             
UTM System will be assured according to the following levels in [NIST800.63.3]: 
1. Identity Assurance Level 3 (IAL3) 
2. Authenticator Assurance Level 3 (AAL3) 
3. Federation Assurance Level 3 (FAL3) 
These Assurance Levels are obtained by considering the "Maximum Potential Impacts           
for Each Assurance Level" as presented in [NIST800.63.3]. Simply described, if any of             
the listed Impacts is "High" for an Assurance Level, then the Assurance Level needs to               
be assigned Level 3. While multiple Impacts may be considered "High" for each             
Assurance Level, the "inconvenience, distress, or damage to standing or reputation"           
and "harm to agency programs or public interests" could be argued to be "High" for               
each Assurance Level. A separate document (or set of documents) will further detail             
the USS identity assurance system within UTM​tbd_id​. 
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17. Threat Modeling 
Many of the requirements in this document were driven by various threat modeling             
exercises. Separate documentation may be produced in the future providing          
summaries of those threat modeling exercises. 
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Elements for Future Research and Definition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tag in text Description 
tbd_alt Determine additional requirements related to altitude reporting 
and transformation. 
tbd_time Determine appropriate time synchronization approach for USSs 
and FIMS. 
tbd_logging Determine requirements for logging data including formats, 
content, and duration of archiving. 
tbd_vols Determine requirements/limits on the definitions of 4D volumes, 
including how many, lateral size, longitudinal size, max height, 
max duration, and/or overall 4D volume measurement. 
tbd_timeconform Determine requirements on how soon a USS must know about 
an operation leaving conformance/entering 
NONCONFORMING state. 
tbd_conformawareness Determine requirements for how aware a USS must be in terms 
of non-position/time elements of an operation that determine its 
conformance. For example, visibility, surveillance coverage, C2 
conditions, etc. 
tbd_uvrs Determine requirements related to supporting UAS Volume 
Reservations. 
tbd_urep Determine the required mechanisms for operator-operator 
information sharing. 
tbd_sign Determine the approach to signing operation plans by the 
vehicle and RPIC. 
tbd_landing Determine appropriate reporting requirements for various types 
of off-nominal landings. 
tbd_dmp Determine the data management plan for data not typically part 
of USS-FIMS or USS-USS communications. Example is 
off-nominal reporting forms/data. 
tbd_qos Determine quality of service requirements for a USS, including 
elements such as up time, response latency, etc. 
tbd_id Determine requirements or guidelines for identity management 
for a USS. 
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Summary of Requirements 
This section is provided for convenience. All of the requirements described in the main              
text of this document are summarized in the table below. For common reference, each              
requirement is provided a unique identifier and title. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Req. ID Requirement 
[UTM-USS-001] 
A USS MUST meet the requirements of the authorizing entity for authority to operate 
as a USS. 
[UTM-USS-002] 
All data exchanges via UTM APIs MUST be completed over a TLS-secured 
connection. 
[UTM-USS-003] 
All TLS implementations for UTM data exchanges MUST conform to the most recent 
version of NIST 800-52. 
[UTM-USS-004] 
A USS MUST communicate with FIMS per the [FIMSUSS-API] and the 
[USSREQ-API]. 
[UTM-USS-005] A USS MUST communicate with other USSs per the [USSREQ-API]. 
[UTM-USS-006] A USS MUST use the [FIMSAuthzAPI] for authorization purposes with other USSs. 
[UTM-USS-007] A USS MUST use the [FIMSAuthzAPI] for authorization purposes with FIMS. 
[UTM-USS-008] A USS MUST implement the [PUBSAFEAPI]. 
[UTM-USS-009] 
When generating a random number for any purpose within the UTM System, a USS 
MUST use a method adhering to the recommendations in [NIST800.90A.R1]. 
[UTM-USS-010] 
When generating a UUID, a USS MUST generate a version 4 UUID as per 
[RFC4122]. 
[UTM-USS-011] JSON text exchanged between USSs MUST be encoded using UTF-8. 
[UTM-USS-012] JSON text exchanged between a USS and FIMS MUST be encoded using UTF-8. 
[UTM-USS-013] 
A USS MUST treat the presence of a byte order mark as a malformed data 
exchange. 
[UTM-USS-014] 
For any exchange of JSON-formatted data, the receiver MUST reply with an HTTP 
400 status code whenever any required field (as specified in the relevant schema 
definition) of the received data is missing. 
[UTM-USS-015] 
If malformed data are received via a RESTful call, the receiver MUST reply with an 
HTTP 400 status code. 
[UTM-USS-016] A USS MUST NOT reject JSON due to the ordering of fields within the JSON. 
[UTM-USS-017] 
A USS MUST adhere to API specifications related to units of measure and their 
formatting. 
[UTM-USS-018] A USS MUST use UTC time for all date-times exchanged with other USSs. 
[UTM-USS-019] A USS MUST use UTC time for all date-times exchanged with FIMS. 
[UTM-USS-020] 
All date-times supplied by a USS to another USS MUST follow the format pattern 
YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm:ss.sssZ. 
[UTM-USS-021] 
All date-times supplied by a USS to FIMS MUST follow the format pattern 
YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm:ss.sssZ. 
[UTM-USS-022] A USS MUST verify that time strings have the format YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm:ss.sssZ. 
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 [UTM-USS-023] 
All altitudes within UTM MUST be in reference to World Geodetic System 1984 [WGS 
84]. 
[UTM-USS-024] To convert between feet and meters, the USS MUST use a factor of 0.3048 m/ft. 
[UTM-USS-025] A USS MUST adhere to the requirements described in [UTMAuth]. 
[UTM-USS-026] 
A USS MUST NOT request tokens with duplicate parameters while it is in possession 
of a valid token with those parameters and a valid use time of at least 50% of its 
initial valid use time. 
[UTM-USS-027] 
A USS MUST ensure that its access tokens stored on its systems are inaccessible to 
external entities. 
[UTM-USS-028] 
A USS MUST remove all traces of another USS’s valid access token from its systems 
after the token serves its purpose of authorizing appropriate access. 
[UTM-USS-029] A USS MUST adhere to the requirements for discovery as described in [UTMDisc]. 
[UTM-USS-030] 
A USS MUST protect an operator's Personally Identifiable Information (PII) from 
unlawful and/or unintended disclosure. 
[UTM-USS-031] 
Prior to a non-hobbyist operation, a USS MUST ensure the vehicle designated for an 
Operation it is supporting is properly registered. 
[UTM-USS-032] 
A USS MUST ensure that a UAS operator's plan conforms to published airspace 
rules and regulations. 
[UTM-USS-033] 
A USS MUST supply a position report from within the last 2 seconds for any 
non-hobbyist operation supported by that USS within 1 second of receiving an 
authorized request for that position. 
[UTM-USS-034] 
When requested, a USS MUST supply operation information to the requesting 
operator associated with that operation. 
[UTM-USS-035] 
A USS MUST offer a mechanism to receive messages related to in-flight 
emergencies from a supported operation. 
[UTM-USS-036] 
A USS MUST acknowledge a message related to an in-flight emergency from a 
supported operation. 
[UTM-USS-037] A USS MUST assign a GUFI as a UUIDv4 for each supported operation. 
[UTM-USS-038] A USS MUST keep a GUFI constant once assigned to an operation. 
[UTM-USS-039] 
A USS MUST report the valid state of an operation within 2 seconds of receiving a 
valid request for that state. 
[UTM-USS-040] 
A USS MUST maintain the state of an operation as ACCEPTED at all times from 
announcing it via the UTM APIs until an event causes a transition to another state. 
[UTM-USS-041] 
A USS MUST maintain the state of an operation as ACTIVATED at all times after the 
start time of its first operation volume until it is closed while it is in conformance with 
its plan and the rules of the airspace. 
[UTM-USS-042] 
A USS MUST transition an operation to the CLOSED state when it is no longer flying 
and will not fly again. 
[UTM-USS-043] A USS MUST announce any transition to the CLOSED state to its LUN. 
[UTM-USS-044] 
A USS MUST define a Conformance Volume for each Operation Volume for each 
operation. 
[UTM-USS-045] 
A Conformance Volume MUST be contained in all four dimensions within its 
associated Operation Volume. 
[UTM-USS-046] A USS MUST be aware within 1 second that an operation under its management is 
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 out of conformance. 
[UTM-USS-047] 
The USS MUST maintain a record of the state of a nonconforming operation as 
NONCONFORMING. 
[UTM-USS-048] 
A USS MUST announce to its LUN a NONCONFORMING operation within 2 
seconds of transitioning an operation into the NONCONFORMING state. 
[UTM-USS-049] 
A USS MUST announce to its LUN within 2 seconds of transitioning an operation into 
the ACTIVATED state from the NONCONFORMING state. 
[UTM-USS-050] 
A USS MUST designate the state of an operation that has been in the 
NONCONFORMING state for 30 continuous seconds as ROGUE. 
[UTM-USS-051] 
A USS MUST designate the state of an operation that has transitioned to the 
NONCONFORMING state more than 3 times as ROGUE. 
[UTM-USS-052] 
A USS MUST designate the state of an operation that is not contained within at least 
one of its Operation Volumes as ROGUE. 
[UTM-USS-053] 
A USS MUST announce to its LUN a ROGUE operation within 2 seconds of 
transitioning that operation to the ROGUE state. 
[UTM-USS-054] A USS MUST NOT transition a ROGUE operation to any state other than CLOSED. 
[UTM-USS-055] 
The USS MUST change the state of a ROGUE operation to CLOSED when that 
operation has ceased operating and not before it has ceased operating. 
[UTM-USS-056] 
A USS MUST provide at least one Contingency Plan per Operation Volume within an 
Operation plan as defined per the [USSREQ-API]. 
[UTM-USS-057] 
When a Contingency Plan is put into action, the USS MUST post a message 
containing the Contingency Plan to each USS in its LUN. 
[UTM-USS-058] 
A USS MUST update the LUN via a message when any Contingency Plan ends or 
changes. 
[UTM-USS-059] 
A USS MUST define and announce an updated, deconflicted operation plan for an 
operation that intersects another operation of higher priority within 30 seconds of the 
announcement of the higher priority operation. 
[UTM-USS-060] 
A USS MUST send a message to its LUN when an in-flight emergency is determined 
for an operation under its management. 
[UTM-USS-061] 
A message describing an operation in an urgency condition MUST denote a severity 
level lower than EMERGENCY according to the UTM API documentation. 
[UTM-USS-062] 
A message describing an operation in a distress condition MUST denote a severity 
level of EMERGENCY. 
[UTM-USS-063] 
A USS MUST update the operation plan of an operation under its management that 
enters or exits an in-flight emergency state. 
[UTM-USS-064] 
A USS MUST announce a new Operation via the [USSREQ-API] to all USSs that 
intersect that new Operation. 
[UTM-USS-065] 
A USS MUST announce modifications to an existing Operation via the 
[USSREQ-API] to all USS Instances that intersect the modified Operation. 
[UTM-USS-066] 
A USS MUST collect position updates from all ACTIVATED Part 107X operations 
that it manages. 
[UTM-USS-067] 
A USS MUST provide access to all Part 107X operation position updates from 
operations that it manages to FIMS upon request per the [USSREQ-API]. 
[UTM-USS-068] 
A USS MUST provide access to position updates for a Part 107X operation that it 
manages (Operation A) to another USS upon request when that second USS has an 
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[UTM-USS-069] 
A USS MUST provide access to position updates (if available) for operations that it 
manages to its LUN for all operations in the ROGUE or NONCONFORMING states. 
[UTM-USS-070] 
A USS MUST offer a method for operators with operations under that USS's 
management to report weather and air traffic observations. 
[UTM-USS-071] 
A USS MUST share reports regarding weather and air traffic as supplied by an 
operator, with other UTM stakeholders. 
[UTM-USS-072] 
A USS MUST provide a means for operators with operations under that USS's 
management to receive weather and air traffic observations from other stakeholders. 
[UTM-USS-073] 
Prior to a non-hobbyist operation becoming ACTIVATED, a USS MUST obtain a 
digital signature of the most recent version of an operation plan by the RPIC for that 
operation. 
[UTM-USS-074] 
Prior to a non-hobbyist operation becoming ACTIVATED, a USS MUST obtain a 
digital signature of the most recent version of an operation plan by the vehicle for that 
operation. 
[UTM-USS-075] 
Prior to a non-hobbyist operation becoming ACTIVATED, a USS MUST obtain a copy 
of all operation authorizations, if any, under which that operation will be performed. 
[UTM-USS-076] 
A USS MUST obtain an off-nominal situation report from the operator for each 
ROGUE operation. 
[UTM-USS-077] 
A USS MUST obtain an off-nominal situation report from the operator for each 
operation that has an unplanned return to the launch location. 
[UTM-USS-078] 
A USS MUST obtain an off-nominal situation report from the operator for each 
operation that has an unplanned landing. 
[UTM-USS-079] 
A USS MUST obtain an off-nominal situation report from the operator for each 
operation that enters an unplanned loiter. 
[UTM-USS-080] 
A USS MUST obtain an off-nominal situation report from the operator for each 
operation results in the loss of the UA. 
[UTM-USS-081]  
Whenever a USS is required to obtain an off-nominal situation report from an 
operator, the USS MUST do so within 3 days of the operation completion. 
[UTM-USS-082] A USS MUST obtain data from the operator's platform per a Data Management Plan. 
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